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During the past three decades, formal financial 
institutions (FFis) in low-income countries (LICs) have 
I channeled large amounts of credit to agriculture. At the same time, through legal and financial controls, goverrunents 
I have kept at low levels the rates of interest that FFis can 
charge on loans. The preferential rates charged for loans 
I in agriculture and, in particular, those for small farmers 
I 
have been especially low. Recent financial reforms in some 
LICs, although increasing most rates, often have not raised 
I the preferential rates for agriculture. As a result, interest rate differentials between agriculture and nonagri-
I culture have increased. These differentials have not 
reflected the costs and risks of FFis lending to different 
I borrower classes. Rather, they have reflected the political 
I 
intent to favor some groups at the expense of others. 
Often the preferential rates have been mandated with 
I the best of intentions. They may have been adopted to pro-mote socially desirable activities or to benefit marginal 
I groups. Unfortunately, such preferential-rate policies have 
frequently resulted in consequences opposite of those 
I desired and have repressed savings mobilization and formal 
financial intermediation in general, thus causing lower 
I rates of economic growth. By reducing the size of domestic 
I 
I 
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formal financial markets, these policies have had the effect 
of increasing the importance of foreign debt as a means of 
financing capital formation and of augmenting the dependency 
of LICs. By distorting the allocative functions of interest 
rates, these policies have prevented savings from being 
channeled to their most socially profitable uses. 
FFis take into account the costs and risks associated 
with lending to different borrower classes. If forced to 
charge differential interest rates, they adopt predictable 
rationing mechanisms that have a considerable impact on the 
final allocation of credit. In the discussion that follows, 
I explore the determinants of the behavior of borrowers and 
lenders under interest-rate restrictions. I examine the 
consequences of such controls on the final composition of 
loan portfolios, and argue that the behavior of borrowers 
and lenders leads to a redistribution of loan portfolios to 
a relatively small number of large borrowers as well as to 
the exclusion from these portfolios of large numbers of 
small potential borrowers. 
Impact of Interest-Rate Ceilings 
The traditional analysis of the impact of interest-rate 
ceilings posits a market for credit that is characterized by 
an aggregate demand for loans inversely related to the loan 
rate of interest and an ag<Jre9ate supply of deposits that is 
directly related to the deposit rate of interest. In this 
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model, the .imposi.tion of a. ceiling on the loan rate leads to 
a decline in the rate paid to depositors. As a result, 
fewer resources are mobilized, and the total volume of 
lending declines. Further, at the ceiling loan rate there 
is an excess demand for credit and nonprice rationing mecha-
nisms are required to clear the market. The demands by all 
or some of the .[X>tential borrowers will be totally or par-
tially frustrated. 
It is increasingly recognized that these rationing pro-
cesses have an unfavorable impact on small farmers, as a 
result of the high risks and costs associated with lending 
to small borrowers. The conventional analysis, however, 
does not explain how these rationing processes clear the 
market. In particular, although the conventional model 
shows that depositors are worse off as a consequence of the 
ceiling, it does not show if all borrowers (as a group) or 
specific borrower classes are better off. Since it does not 
explain how the new, smaller amounts of credit are allocated 
among borrower classes, this model cannot predict if the 
reduction in the loan rate is less or more than compensated 
for by a decline in the size of the loans received. Thus, 
the conventional analysis sheds little light on the impact 
of interest-rate ceilings on the allocation of resources and 
on the distribution of income. 
The imposition of a binding ceiling on interest rates 
has at least three aggregate and distributive effects on the 
4 
portfolios of FFis. First, a reduction in the size of the 
total portfolio of assets will occur, because a drop in the 
rate paid on deposits reduces the ability of FFis to attract 
savings. The reduction in the rate of profit caused by the 
ceiling also reduces the ability to attract equity capital 
and to borrow. Second, since ceilings on the loan rates of 
interest reduce the relative profitability of lending, the 
proportion of the total asset portfolio of the FFis devoted 
to loans will decline. Third, a change in the composition 
of the loan portfolio of the FFis will take place. Loan-
rate ceilings alter the relative profitability of loans to 
different borrower classes. Depending on the rationing 
mechanisms adopted, the ceilings lead to changes in the 
relative shares of the loan portfolios going to different 
borrowers. These redistributions usually lead to greater 
portfolio concentration. 
Types of Rationing 
Any loan has three aspects: the size, the interest 
rate charged, and the noninterest terms of the loan 
contract. For the reasons to be discussed, given the risks, 
transaction costs, and information costs associated with 
lending to different borrower classes, most FFis try to 
optimize the adjustment of these three aspects of a loan to 
each particular borrower. When the ceilings on loan rates 
become binding, lenders are forced to adjust the non-
i nterest terms of the loan contract or to reduce loan size. 
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The result is that borrowers receive a less attractive com-
bination of these three aspects of their loans and the pro-
fits of the FFis decline. The welfare of both rationed 
borrowers and of lenders could be improved by the elimina-
tion of the ceilings. 
Of the three ways to clear a credit market (through 
interest rates, through changes in the noninterest terms of 
the loan contract, and through changes in loan size), the 
first two are examples of rationing-through-price, in 
contrast to rationing-through-quantities. (The noninterest 
terms of the loan contract may be considered as elements of 
the price vector of the loan, in addition to the rates 
charged.) The third way, however, is clearly a form of 
nonprice rationing. When the borrowers are rationed out of 
the market by imposition of less attractive noninterest 
terms on the loans, it is the borrower who decides that the 
price is too high. In the event of nonprice rationing, on 
the other hand, the potential borrower is willing to pay the 
full price (all elements in the price vector of the loan), 
but the FFis are not willing to grant a loan of the size 
demanded. In this case, an unsatisfied excess demand for 
credit prevails at the ruling interest rate. In practice, 
when ceilings on loan rates are imposed, rationing will 
occur through changes in both the noninterest terms of the 
loan contract and the loan size. Both types of rationing 
lead to greater loan-portfolio concentration. 
6 
Nonprice Credit Rationing 
Several models of lender behavior can be used to 
explain rationing decisions. Portfolio theory provides 
insights because of uncertainty and risk~ the theory of the 
multiproduct firm is useful because transactions costs and 
product heterogeneity and differentiation are important. 
~lso, it is possible to capture uncertainty and risk within 
the theory of the firm by incorporating an ex ante premium 
for risk in the cost functions of the FFis. 
The application of general theories about price 
controls and black markets to financial markets has been 
useful to explain the existence of nonprice credit 
rationing. The analysis of the determinants of interest 
rates in informal credit markets of LICs and the attempts to 
measure transaction costs, risks of default, and monopoly 
profits have also helped. Theories about nonprice credit 
rationing, however, have been associated mostly with the 
controversy over the availability doctrine. Actually, the 
theory of nonprice credit rationing was developed to show, 
despite Samuelson's 1952 statement to the contrary, that 
this type of rationing behavior is consistent with rational 
profit maximization, even in the absence of interest-rate 
restrictions. ~ fortiori, this behavior is even more likely 
in the presence of such restrictions. 
Hodgman (1960) showed that, because of the existence of 
default risk, any borrower will reach a loan size beyond 
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which he or she will not be able to obtain additional funds 
by promising to pay a higher interest rate. The supply of 
credit to an individual borrower becomes totally inelastic 
because each borrower's wealth and ability to repay are 
finite. To demonstrate the existence of nonprice rationing, 
however, it must be shown that an excess demand for credit 
persists at the rate charged in equilibrium. This requires 
a discussion both of supply and demand. That is, nonprice 
rationing occurs when the lender is unwilling to grant the 
loan demanded by the borrower and offers only a smaller 
amount. ,Jaffee (1971) set up a model of a lender who maxi-
mizes expected profits, taking into account possible 
borrower default. He formulated the lender's expected 
income from each loan as an explicit function of the parame-
ters of the borrower's demand function, the probability of 
default, and the rate of interest charged on the loan. 
Within this framework, the proof of the rationality of 
rationing amounted to showing that the FFI can increase its 
expected profits by rationing some clients. 
Jaffee showed that credit rationing is not profitable 
for a lender acting as a discriminating monopolist (one who 
maximizes expected profits with respect to each borrower 
separately and is free to charge each borrower a different 
interest rate). Rationing is profitable only if there are 
restrictions on interest-rate discrimination. That is, 
limited interest-rate differentiation, in the sense that 
8 
FFis have to charge identical rates to nonidentical 
borrowers, makes it profitable for the FFis to supply some 
borrowers with less than the amount of credit they demand at 
the going rate. Similar behavior will occur when an 
inverted interest-rate structure is enforced. 
Aside from usury ceilings, other legal and moral 
restrictions and considerations of good will make it dif-
ficult to charge widely different interest rates to dif-
ferent borrowers. Instead, FFis usually justify interest-
rate differentials in terms of a few objective criteria, 
such as industry class. A classification scheme of this 
type is likely to result in a tacit collusive oligopolistic 
agreement among FFis. 'rhe structure of interest rates is 
then compressed within narrower limits and nonprice 
rationing occurs. Constraints on rate differentiation may 
also result from the information costs associated with 
distinguishing among different borrowers and their risk 
characteristics (screening costs). 
Keeton (1979) showed that nonprice rationing also takes 
place if risk of default increases with the size of loan or 
if there is a moral-hazard problem. Limited liability may 
increase the riskiness of the project financed by the FFis. 
In some cases, FFis may find it possible to specify all 
relevant characteristics of the investment project as part 
of the loan contract and enforce such agreements by moni-
taring the borrower's behavior. If this cannot be done, 
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FFis will want to take into account the effect that the 
terms of the loan have on the borTower's project choice. A 
change in interest rates affects project choice in the same 
way that a change in coverage influences a policyholder's 
level of care in avoiding accident. This moral hazard may 
perform essentially the same role as interest-rate ceilings 
in inducing non-price credit rationing. 
Moral hazard is only one example of a broader class of 
imperfections that prevail in credit markets. Another type 
of market imperfection arises when the outcome of the 
investment project depends both on some state of nature to 
be realized at a later date and on the amount of additional 
resources that the borrower is willing to contribute to the 
project after that state is realized, but before the loan 
becomes due. Since the borrower receives only that part of 
the outcome that remains after repaying the loan, he or she 
will either contribute the same amount of new resources as 
if the entire outcome were received and repay the loan in 
full or will contribute no new resources and default. Since 
the borrower will choose the latter course whenever the 
amount left over after paying back the loan should be less 
than the opportunity cost of the new resources, an increase 
in the interest rate will increase the likelihood of 
default. 
According to Fried and Howitt {1980), credit rationing 
exists as part of an equilibrium risk-sharing arrangement 
10 
between the FFis and the borrowers. Borrowers and lenders 
can benefit not only from trading loan contracts now but 
also from an understanding, or implicit contract, concerning 
the amounts they will be willing to trade, and at what pri-
ces, under various conditions in the future. This is the 
old "customer relationship." By means of such arrangements, 
borrowers and FFis can share the risks associated with an 
uncertain future. By dampening the movements in interest 
rates, these arrangements open up the possibility of 
nonprice credit rationing. 
Most of the imperfections and costs that explain 
nonprice credit rationing, even in the absence of interest-
rate restrictions, exist in the rural credit markets of 
LICs. Uncertainty, default risks, and transactions, infor-
mation and collection costs are all particularly high in 
these fragmented financial markets. Moral hazard and 
related problems are especially acute. In these markets, 
FFis find many reasons to practice one or more forms of 
nonprice credit rationing. 
A Model of Lender Behavior 
A simple model of nonprice credit rationing, further 
discussed in the Appendix of this chapter, is used here to 
illustrate the differential impact of interest-rate ceilings 
on access to credit by different borrower classes and on 
portfolio concentration. T a.ssnme that the lender is a 
profit-maximizing firm (this asstnnption is further justified 
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in the discussion that follows) and that the lender's only 
source of revenue is the interest payments on loans. There 
are three components of the firm's lending costs: the 
opportunity cost of the funds, the costs of administration 
of the loans, and the losses due to default. 
The opportunity cost of the funds is exogenously given 
to the lender, independently of loan size, and is identical 
for all borrower classes. The costs of administration, in 
turn, include the handling costs of the loan and the risk-
reducing costs of the loan. Handling costs are incurred in 
recording and disbursing the loan and in receiving payments. 
These costs tend to be independent of the size and degree of 
riskiness of the loan. Thus, average handling costs decline 
with loan size. 
Risk-reducing costs are directed at lowering the proba-
bility of default in the loan portfolio through the use of 
information in borrower selection and through collection 
efforts. These costs are not independent of loan size or of 
the expected losses due to default. If more resources are 
spent in loan evaluation and supervision, the lender can 
reduce losses. The lender cannot, however, completely eli-
minate uncertainty about repayment. Therefore, it must 
always include, among its ex ante costs, a premium for risk. 
FFis do not know, ex ante, if a particular borrower 
w il 1 repay a loan. Instead, they must estimate the probable 
losses due to default. This probability of default, and the 
12 
corresponding premium for risk, depend on the borrower's 
ability and willingness to repay. This is a function of the 
outcome of the productive activity financed with the loan 
and of the value of the additional collateral offered. 
In order to determine the probable losses due to 
default, FFis usually distinguish among several borrower 
classes and estimate that a certain proportion of the 
borrowers in a given class will default. In addition, FFis 
estimate the expected losses related to this default. It is 
in the interest of FFis to distinguish among as many 
borrower classes as possible. However, this requires infor-
mation that is costly to acquire and process, so instead 
FFis set up a small number of borrower classes and estimate 
cost functions, including an ~ ante premium for risk, for 
each class. Because of the nature of their productive acti-
vities and of the collateral offered, loans to borrowers in 
certain classes are riskier than loans to other borrowers. 
Therefore, although FFis will charge the same premium for 
risk for a loan of a given size within a given borrower 
class, they will want to charge a different premium to 
borrowers in different classes. 
Even though additional information reduces the required 
premium for risk, it also increases administration costs. 
In order to estimate their cost functions, FFis must deter-
mine the optimum (least-cost) combination of information 
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costs and the residual risk accepted. The sum of the pre-
mium for risk and the risk-reducing administration costs 
will be minimized when the marginal cost of additional 
information is equated to the marginal return of using addi-
tional information to reduce default losses. 
Interest-rate restrictions and other financial regula-
tions usually tend to restrict the use of information by 
FFis. If FFis operate with narrow margins, the evaluation 
of mortgageable property may be the only risk-reducing acti-
vity they can afford. As a result, the allocation of loans 
will be strongly influenced by the type of security offered. 
Under these conditions small farmers with few assets to 
offer will be penalized. 
The costs of, and returns to, the use of information in 
borrower selection are a function of the degree of homoge-
neity among borrowers. Homogeneity makes it possible to 
have few borrower classes. Given the heterogeneity found 
among small farmers in LICs, however, FFis ought to 
establish a relatively large number of classes. But 
interest-rate ceilings restrict the number of borrower 
classes that FFis can serve. As a result of these ceilings, 
many small producers and new potential borrowers are thrown 
into the class of nonborrowers, because FFis cannot afford 
the information costs involved in classifying them in one of 
the established classes. Since the risk premium for this 
residual class of potential borrowers is too high, compared 
14 
to the interest-rate ceilings, these producers are excluded 
from the portfolios of the FFis. 
For a given borrower class, the premium for risk 
increases with loan size, as long as the project financed is 
of a fixed size; the project financed, even of variable 
size, shows diminishing marginal returns; the variance of 
marginal returns increases with loan size; or the value of 
the collateral offered does not increase as rapidly as loan 
size. Given diminishing marginal returns to the use of 
information, this implies that the (optimal) sum of risk-
reducing costs and premium for risk increases with loan 
size. As a result, the marginal costs of lending are an 
increasing function of loan size. 
As mentioned earlier, loan contracts have many dimen-
sions. Thus, loans are viewed as nonhomogeneous products by 
lenders. In particular, loans to different classes of 
borrowers are treated as different products if the lender 
distinguishes among the classes and estimates different cost 
functions for each borrower class. It is appropriate, 
therefore, to use the theory of the multiproduct firm to 
examine lender behavior. 
This is done in the model presented in the Appendix, 
which shows that, when the lender can behave as a perfectly 
discriminating monopolist, it will charge different interest 
rates to different borrowers, reflecting the different 
elasticities of demands for credit as well as the different 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
15 
marginal costs of lending to alternative borrower classes. 
If, on the other hand, loan rates are constrained, profit 
maximization may require nonprice credit rationing. In 
effect, if the constrained loan rate is higher than the 
marginal cost of lending for the size of loan demanded, the 
borrower will not be rationed, but if the constrained rate 
is lower than marginal cost, the lender will limit the size 
of the loan granted. A larger loan would simply imply an 
addition to costs higher than the addition to revenues and a 
reduction in expected profits. Depending, therefore, on the 
relative level of the ceilings, with respect to the various 
marginal cost of lending curves, some or all of the borrower 
classes may be subject to nonprice rationing, and some 
borrowers will receive loans smaller than those demanded. 
The Iron Law of Interest-Rate Restrictions 
Nonprice credit rationing is widely practiced by FFis 
in LICs, and the lenders employ many devices to restrict the 
size of the loans granted to certain borrower classes. One 
of the most popular mechanisms for rationing credit is to 
specify, for each crop, the maximum amount that can be 
granted per unit of land cultivated. Frequently, the pro-
portion of total costs represented by these amounts varies 
significantly from crop to crop. These differences tend to 
reflect the perceptions of FFis about the risks and costs 
associated with loans for the production of different crops. 
Usually the proportion financed is higher for the safer, 
16 
more profitable export crops than for the small-farmer sub-
sistence crops. The setting of these limits has also been 
vulnerable to pressures from growers associations, par-
ticularly in the case of public FFis and at times when the 
implicit interest-rate subsidy has been substantial. 
Rationed borrowers are thus forced to complement the loans 
received from the FFis with loans obtained in informal ere-
dit markets, at higher interest rates. The extent of this 
additional financing reflects the extent of excess demand 
for credit from the FFis. 
In LICs, the loan portfolios of FFis usually include 
both rationed and nonrationed classes of borrowers. When 
interest-rate ceilings become more restrictive, the size of 
the loans granted to the nonrationed borrower classes 
increases, while the size of the loans granted to the 
rationed borrower classes diminishes. This is the Iron Law 
of Interest Rate Restrictions. 
A two-borrower case is shown in Figure 1. Positive 
loan amounts, L1 and L2 are measured in both directions 
I 
from the origin, 0. Demand for credit curves for each 
borrower, n1 and D2, are inversely related to the real rate 
of interest charged, r. The lender's marginal cost curves, 
MC1 and MC 2 , increase with loan size. At n given interest-
rate ceiling, r*, the rationed borrower (represented in the 
* 
right-hand quadrant) receives a loan of size L1 , which 
equates the interest rate charged with the marginal cost of 
lending and leaves the borrower with an unsatisfied demand 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
] 
I 
I 
I 
I I 7 
I 
I ... ~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I M i:..:i 0 • ~ t1 ::> I C,!) 1-1 I ~ 
I I " ----t----- ---- ~ 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
" ~ 
I 
I 
I 
18 
for credit. The nonrationed borrower, represented in the 
* left-hand quadrant, receives the size of loan demanded, L2· 
* ** As the interest-rate ceiling is lowered from r to r , the 
size of the loan granted to the nonrationed borrower 
* increases, from L2 to M2 , as he or she demands a larger 
loan. At the same time, the size of the loan granted to the 
* 
rationed borrower declines, from L1 to M1 (movement along 
the lender's marginal cost curve, not along the borrower's 
demand curve) . 
The changes in loan size implied by the Iron Law of 
Interest Rate Restrictions cause a redistribution of the 
loan portfolios of the FFis, as the nonrationed borrowers 
get larger shares of these portfolios and the rationed 
borrowers get smaller shares. Finally, when the interest-
rate ceiling becomes very low, some borrower classes are 
excluded altogether from formal loans. A large proportion 
of the rural producerg in LICs are in these excluded groups. 
Since the nonrationed borrowers tend to be the large, 
wealthy, and influential producers, who are already 
receiving the largest loans, the behavior of the FFis 
implied by the Iron Law of Interest Rate Restrictions leads 
to a further concentration of the size distribution of their 
loans. This process of increasing concentration is acce-
lerated by the exclusion of potential borrower classes from 
the credit portfolios, as the FFis are precluded from 
covering their average variable costs of lending in these 
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cases. This pro~cessive concentration of loan portfolios 
and the exclusion of marginal producers from access to 
institutional credit significantly worsens tl1e distribution 
of wealth. 
High transaction costs for both lenders and borrowers 
limit the size of rural financial markets in LICs. When 
ceilings are imposed on interest rates, FFis may be unable 
to cover these costs. Because of this, they will practice 
nonprice credit rationing and manipulate the noninterest 
terms of the loan contracts. The stricter terms of the 
contract shift some transaction costs from the FFis to the 
borrowers, but this shift does not affect all classes of 
borrowers uniformly. Rather, it tends to restrict the 
access of marginal borrowers to institutional credit more 
than proportionately, in the fashion of the Iron Law of 
Interest Rate Restrictions, and further contributes to a 
higher concentration of loan portfolios. 
Rationing and the Lender's Objective Function 
The models of lender behavior presented in this chapter 
are based on the assumption of profit maximization as the 
lender's objective. This assumption, however, is not 
necessary, and the results obtained ~ not dependent on it. 
The composition of the credit portfolios of FFis is not a 
random or unconscious result; it is the consequence of 
lenders' attempts to optimize a given objective function 
within the constraints they face. That is, FFis can be 
20 
treated as rational optimizers that possess an explicitly or 
implicitly defined objective function and attempt to get the 
optimum result from their operations. 
Different types of FFls, of course, have different 
objective functions. Some of them are small private banks 
maximizing profits, whereas others are large banks 
attempting to maximize market shares; some of them are 
public development banks attempting to maximize their poli-
tical influence, and others are public or private institu-
tions maximizing staff expenditures, managerial emoluments, 
or discretionary profits under different sets of 
constraints. Given these constraints, all of them are 
attempting to maximize some utility function, in terms of 
their managers' set of preferences, through the pursuit of 
either profit maximizing or nonprofit maximizing strategies 
or of some combination of both. Although the actual impact 
of interest rate restrictions on the behavior of FFis 
depends on the nature of their particular objective func-
tions, some general considerations can be made. 
For our purposes, FFis can be grouped into two classes: 
those with an objective function that includes financial 
viability and institutional survival among the goals pursued 
and those with an objective function that does not include 
financial viability. This second group of lenders includes 
pilot projects not interested in a permanent presence as a 
lender in the rural areas. It also includes agencies set up 
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to temporarily disburse relief loans. The first group 
includes all FFis that, independently of the kinds of goals 
they are attempting to achieve, operate under the constraint 
that they must remain financially viable. 
For FFis to remain financially viable they must be able 
to preserve, and possibly increase, their loan portfolio in 
real terms. 'l'hat is, they must maintain the purchasing 
power of their assets. To do this, their revenues must 
cover a significant portion, if not all, of their lending 
costs. To remain financially viable, therefore, FFis must 
take into account revenues and costs; that is, they must 
have a profits strategy. As was pointed out by Bourne and 
Graham (1984), if they do not, they will not survive. 
In order to survive and maintain their relative impor-
tance within the financial sector, FFis must preserve the 
purchasing power of the claims on resources they mobilize. 
Otherwise, they will be less able to serve their clients, 
their market shares will decline, and the political support 
that they need for their survival will diminish. FFis are 
able to preserve the real size of their portfolios to the 
extent that they protect them from the eroding impact of 
inflation, to the extent that they collect the loans 
granted, and to the extent that they are able to generate 
sufficiently high profits. 
Consider, for example, two identical FFis, each one 
supplying 50 percent of the local credit market. One of 
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them generates profits of 2 percent per year; while the 
other generates annual profits of 12 percent. After 10 
years, ceteris paribus, the more profitable institution will 
be serving 72 percent of this credit market, whereas the 
less profitable one will be serving only 28 percent. 
Some FFis may have continued access to the government 
budget, central bank rediscounting, or cheap credit from 
international agencies, that allows them to remain tem-
porarily viable, despite their losses. However, some 
measure of profitability is always included in evaluations 
of the performance of FFis. International agencies and 
fiscal sources are usually only willing to continue with 
their support as long as the FFis' losses are modest and 
temporary. International agencies are also judged by the 
success and financial strength of the FFis they support. If 
FFis' losses are high, international agencies will demand a 
management change or will request institutional reforms and 
program reorientations before they continue with their sup-
port. When the losses of FFis are large, fiscal sources may 
not possess sufficient resources to continually provide the 
transfers needed. This is especially true of governments in 
LICs that are facing severe budgetary problems. Although 
inflationary financing from the central bank could make 
transfers in nominal terms possible, the ensuing inflation 
would erode the real value of the portfolio of the FFis even 
faster. 
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Moreover, F~Is that receive large fiscal transfers lose 
their independence and are forced to accept political 
guidance in credit allocation. When banking and economic 
criteria are replaced by administrative and political deci-
sions, the credit-rationing process becomes more vulnerable 
to pressures from specific borrower groups, and loan port-
folios become more concentrated. Also, the reluctance of 
politicians to take into account creditworthiness and to 
enforce vigorous collection policies leads to high rates of 
default. These FFis become costly and arbitrary mechanisms 
for political income transfers to relatively few borrowers 
and, unless huge fiscal transfers are forthcoming, do not 
long survive. 
Conclusions 
In most LICs, the interest rates charged by FFis on 
agricultural loans have been administratively set or are 
constrained by regulations. As a result, these rates have 
been too rigid in nominal terms and too erratic and unpre-
dictable in real terms; too low, from several perspectives; 
and too differentiated. FFis have been forced to charge the 
lowest rates where they would have liked to charge the 
highest rates. This inverted structure of interest rates 
has accentuated the differential impact of the costs of 
lending on the relative profitability of loans to different 
borrower classes and has distorted the allocation of the 
loan portfolios of the FFis among borrower classes. 
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The conventional model, on the basis of an aggregate 
demand and supply of credit, cannot explain the distributive 
consequences of interest rate restrictions. ~his chapter 
has explored models of nonprice credit rationing and of 
rationing through the noninterest terms of the loan 
contracts, to show how interest rate ceilings restrict the 
access of small farmers to institutional credit, and how 
this results in a high degree of concentration of the loan 
portfolios of the FFis. 
In particular, the chapter has shown that, according to 
the Iron Law of Interest Rate Restrictions, as interest-rate 
ceilings become more restrictive, the size of the loans 
granted to nonrationed large producers increases, while the 
size of loans granted to rationed small producers decreases. 
This behavior of lenders leads to a redistribution of loan 
portfolios in favor of the larger borrowers. Through these 
mechanisms, therefore, the interest-rate ceilings enforced 
in most of the LICs have been an important determinant of 
the limited access to institutional credit and the high 
degree of concentration of loan portfolios that characterize 
rural financial markets. 
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Appendix on Profit-Maximizing Rationing 
With respect to a given borrower class, the lender's costs, 
as a function of loan size, have been defined as 
(1) C = dL + H +XL 
where: C: total cost of the loan, 
d: constant average opportunity cost of the funds, 
L: loan size, 
H: fixed handling costs of the loan, and 
x: optimum sum of average risk-reducing costs and the 
premium for risk. 
In turn, the lender's profit function can be defined as 
n n 
( 2) 1t = L: Ri - l: Ci 
R· 1 
r· 1 
C· 1 
the lender's total profits, 
revenues from a loan to the ith borrower (or class), 
the interest rate charged to the ith borrower (or class), 
the size of the loan granted to the ith borrower (or 
class), and 
the total cost of the loan granted to the ith borrower 
(or class) • 
If the lender is a perfectly discriminating monopolist, it 
will charge different interest rates for a loan of the same size 
to borrowers of different classes, as well as different interest 
rates for loans of different sizes within a given borrower class. 
In this case, the first order conditions for profit maximization 
are 
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( 3) 0 n; 
~ l. 
£...S.i 
o Li = 0. 
That is, profit maximization requires that the marginal revenue 
and the marginal cost of the loan be equated for the size of loan 
granted to each particular borrower. In these circumstances, the 
rates of interest charged to different borrowers will differ, 
reflecting both the different elasticities of the demand for ere-
dit from different borrowers and the different marginal costs of 
lending to them. Obviously, nonprice rationing will not occur in 
this case. This situation is represented for a two-borrower case 
in Figure 2. 
In Figure 2, positive loan amounts (L1 and L2) are measured 
in both directions from the origin, O. The demand functions for 
each borrower (D 1 and D2 ) are inversely related to the real rate 
of interest charged, r. Marginal revenue functions for the 
lender (MR1 and MR 2 ) are associated with the demand functions. 
The lender's marginal cost functions (MC1 and MC2) increase with 
the size of loan. Profit maximization requires that marginal 
revenue be equated to marginal cost for each borrower. Thus, the 
lender must grant loans of size Mi and M2 and charge different 
interest rates, r 1 and r 2 , to the two borrowers. 
The simplest restriction that can be imposed on the rates of 
interest charged by FFis is the requirement that they charge a 
uniform interest rate to all borrowers. It is assumed that FFis 
are free to set this uniform rate at their most profitable level. 
The model can be used to show that in this case profit maximiza-
tion may require nonprice credit rationing. 
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Given the possibility of rationing (that is, the existence 
of individual excess demands for credit at the uniform interest 
rate charged by the lender), the profit-maximizing loan sizes for 
different borrowers can be obtained. This can be done, following 
Eckaus (1974), through the solution of a programming problem in 
which the demand functions are introduced as inequality 
constraints. If there is no rationing, loan size will equal the 
amount of credit demanded at the uniform rate charged. If there 
is rationing, the inequality constraint will be binding, and an 
excess demand for credit will exist. The programming problem 
consists of maximizing lender's profits, given the uniform rate 
charged and the size of the loans granted to different borrowers, 
subject to the constraints that the rate charged be the same for 
all borrowers and that the size of each loan be equal to or less 
than the amount demanded at the profit-maximizing rate. 
The lender's total profits can be defined as 
n n 
( 4) n = r L L. - L C. 
1 1 
Total profits must be maximized, subject to 
( 5) L. - D. < 0 
1 1 
r > 0 
L. > 0 
1 
The corresponding Lagrangian function K is 
n n n 
{ 6 ) K = r L: L. - L: C. - L: A.. (L. - D.) 
1 1 1 1 1 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximum profits are 
( 7} o D. 1 
----0 r < 0 
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0 c. o K 
o L. 
l. 
= r - ___ -!:, - A . < 0 
o L. l. -
n 
r E [L. + A. 
l. l. 
L. - D. < 0 
l. l. -
n 
l. 
o D. n o C. 
l. l. 
o r ] + E Li [ r - o.L 
l. 
E A. (L. - D.) = 0 
l. l. l. 
A· < 0 l. 
L. > 0 
l. 
r > 0 
- A.] = 0 
l. 
These conditions imply that when credit rationing does not 
take place, the Lagrangian multiplier must be strictly positive. 
That is, if a borrower receives the size of the loan demanded, 
Li = Di and Ai > O. On the other hand, credit rationing occurs 
when Li - Di < O. In this case, the Lagrangian multiplier must 
be equal to zero; i.e., Ai= O. Therefore, when in the 
programming exercise one of the Lagrangian multipliers becomes 
equal to zero, the corresponding borrower (or class) is rationed. 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that, for the Lagrangian 
multipliers to become equal to zero and for rationing to occur, 
the rate of interest charged has to become equal to the marginal 
cost of granting the loan. If there is no rationing, the rate of 
interest charged has to be higher than the corresponding marginal 
cost. 
Therefore, when a uniform but free interest rate is 
enforced, if the profit maximizing rate is less than the marginal 
30 
cost of lending to a particular borrower, the lender will limit 
the size of the loan granted and an excess demand for credit 
(D~ - L~) will prevail at the rate charged. If, in these 
l. l. 
circumstances, the lender granted a larger loan, as demanded, the 
addition to its costs would be higher than the addition to its 
revenues, and its expected profits would decline. The optimum 
uniform rate must be bounded by the rates that a discriminating 
monopolist would charge to the various borrowers, so that at 
least one class of borrowers will not be rationed. 
As indicated earlier, Figure 2 shows a two-borrower situa-
tion where ~ and M2 are the profit-maximizing size of loans 
granted by an unconstrained discriminating monopolist, while 
r 1 and r 2 are the interest rates charged. The profit-maximizing 
interest rate set by a lender forced to charge a uniform rate to 
* * all borrowers is r*, while L1 and L2 are the size of loans 
granted in this case. Given the levels of the marginal cost 
curves and of the uniform interest rate, one borrower is not 
* * * 
rationed while the other one is (L1 < D1 ), where D1 is the size 
of loan demanded at r*. 
Nonprice credit rationing will be practiced, ~ fortiori, 
when a binding ceiling on interest rates is enforced. Assume 
* that a ceiling r is imposed on the rates of interest charged on 
all kinds of loans. In this case, the lender's profit function 
will be 
* n n ( 8) n = r E L. - E C. 
l. l. 
This function has to be maximized subject to 
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( 9) L. - D. < 0 
1 1 
L. > 0 
1 
* 0 < r < ri: 
that is, the ceiling is binding for all borrowers. The 
corresponding Lagrangian function is 
* n n n ( 10) K = r I: L. - I: C. - I: A.. (L. - D. ) 
l. 1 1 1 1 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for maximum profits are 
o K * 
0 c. 
( 11) 1 A.. < 0 5L:- = r ~ - 1 
1 1 
n 
* 
0 c. 
1 I: (r A. • ) L. = 0 0 L. l. l. 
1 
A.. (L. - D.) < 0 
l. l. l. 
L. - D. < 0 
l. l. 
L. > 0 
1 
A.. < 0 
l. 
Again, these conditions imply that, in the absence of 
rationing, the Lagrangian multipliers will be strictly positive. 
This implies that marginal cost is lower than the given interest-
rate ceiling. On the other hand, rationing implies that "-i = O. 
Thus, when rationing is taking place, the marginal cost of the 
loan is being equated to the ceiling interest rate. Depending on 
the relative level of the ceiling, with respect to the marginal 
cost curves of lending, some or all of the borrowers may be sub-
jected to nonprice credit rationing. 
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